

Threat landscape is evolving



Stuxnet Iran nuclear plant Saudi Aramco

45.000 machines infected PLC modified and destroved



Shamoon attack

30.000 Windows-based machines infected



Unknown malware German steel mill

Uncontrolled shutdown of a blast furnace due to control component breakdowns



Sandworm, BlackEnergy Ukraine

200.000 people left without electricity due to grid blackout



Triton Saudi Arabia

Engineering workstation infected with the Triton malware causing the plant safety system to shutdown.



Crash Override

Tools with specific ICS attacks built in

Ransomware

Geopolitical concerns

2010

2014

2015


2016

2017

2019: What's Next?


ICS specific tools emerging, Willingness to attack ICS systems is increasing, Supply chain is becoming a more common target, Reputation and Trust are becoming increasingly important.

Regulations and Standards



IEC62443 is a key standard and followed by Schneider Electric.

Note the high degree of overlap with other standards and regulations (e.g. NERC CIP)





Cybersecurity lexicon and vocabulary

Security levels define the cybersecure functions embedded in our products, it increases the product robustness and makes it resistant to the Cyber threats.

Groups/Nation-states, governmental organization member...

Cybercrime player, Terrorists, Hacktivists, Professional thieves, Cyber-criminals, competitors

Insider
(Disgruntled employees or contractors...) or intruder
(Thrill-seeking, hobbyist, malicious organization...)

Insider (Well-intentioned, careless employees or contractors)



Protection against intentional violation using sophisticated means with extended resources, system specific skills and high motivation

SL4



Protection against intentional violation using sophisticated means with moderate resources, system specific skills and moderate motivation

SL3



Protection against intentional violation using simple means with low resources,
generic skills and low motivation

SL₂



Protection against casual or coincidental violation

SL₁

IEC62443 - FR / SL - simplified/partial view

- Multifactor authentication for human users over all networks

- Dual approval enforcement for sensitive operations
- Protection of time source integrity
- Audit records on write-once media - Security self-tests

during runtime

- Confidentiality of information traversing zone boundaries
- Logical and physical network isolation between critical and non-critical control systems

- Independence from

- Centralized account management

- Hardware security for machine credentials

- Centralized auditing

management for malicious code protection
- Communications secured with

cryptography

Centralized

- Purging of volatile shared memory resources
- non-system networks
 Able to prevent any communication Programment Programment
 - Programmatic access to audit logs
- other systems or networks - Backup automation

- Limit DoS effects to

SL2

S

- Authentication of human and machine users
- Support of PKI certificates mgt
- Authorization enforcement for human and machine users
- Configurable permissions for roles
- Protection of audit information
- Confidentiality of information at rest and in transit via untrusted networks
- Purging of all private information when decommissioned
- Physical network segmentationDeny by default,

through the system

boundary

- Deny by default, allow by exception
- Continuous
 monitoring of
 security mechanism
 performances
 DoS: Manage
 communication loads
 System component
 inventory

SL1

 α

- Authentication of human users - Account management
- Authorization enforcement for human users - Auditing (secure

logging)

- Integrity of transmitted information - Integrity of Software, and
- Confidentiality of private information at rest and in transit
- Logical network segmentationZone boundary protection
- protection
 Application
 partitioning

- Audit log consultation

DoS protection Backup & Recovery

FR 1 - IAC
Identification and
Authentication
Gontrol

FR 2 - UC Use Control FR 3 - SI System Integrity

information at rest

FR 4 - DC Data Confidentiality FR 5 - RDF Restricted Data Flow

FR 6 - TRE Timely Response to Events FR 7 - RA Resource Availability

ION Meter Cybersecurity

Advanced security for the most advanced meters in the world

Train Require Design Implement Verify Release Deploy Respond

Designed, built & tested according to Schneider Electric's Secure Development Lifecycle Process

- Assures resilient design & formal customer response in event of vulnerabilities
- Penetration and Achilles testing in coordination with Schneider Cybersec Labs

Technology Summary

- Digital signature on firmware upgrade files
- Secure protocol support (HTTPS today, work in progress today on SFTP and SSH)
- Features aligned with NERC/CIP needs:
 - Up to 50 user accounts with configurable access rights
 - Ability to enable/disable physical comm ports, and TCP ports
 - Ability to reassign TCP port numbers for most protocols
 - Audit logging for all login/configuration events, Syslog support
- Security with ION, FTP, HTTP(S), and display:
 - "Standard security" uses numeric password
 - "Advanced security" provides user accounts with configurable access rights and alphanumeric passwords
 - Protocol lockout feature (after too many invalid login attempts for a given user/protocol/port, a temporary lockout period is enforced
 - "Factory" access strictly controlled, disabled by default
- Hardware lock for utility metering applications



Current Firmware:

ION8650:

- V004.021.000 AE-1922 Rev. 3/MAL-E465
 - FW Version V004.020.001 was corrected
 - Modified test provisions to support testing VAh, I^2h, and V^2h, on VARh LED on V004.020.000 firmware and later
 - Identified change made to battery connector to increase long-term reliability

ION7400:

- V002.001.000 AE-2326 Rev. 01
 - New support for Firmware V002.001.000









Firmware Updates:


ION8650:


V4.31.1 released globally May 2019

- V004.031.001 (MC submission coming soon)
- Added support for Outage Notification Feature
 - I/O Order Option "D"
 - JSON Outage Notification with Configurable Delay
- JSON Push over HTTP/s via Alert Module
- Support for HTTPS* & DNS
 - *Only for Alert JSON Push Messaging over Ethernet
- Increased Comm's Robustness
 - DNP3.0 Update Configurable timeout setting added
 - Increased and corrected memory allocations to better handle heavy comm's loading
- New Transient Detection Mode
 - Select between Waveshape Alarm (traditional) or Absolute (Peak)













Firmware Update

ION7400:

V002.001.000 – MC Approved Sept. 2019

- PTP support
- HTTPS Support
- Pre/Post event logging for data and waveform recorders
- Support for various compliance
 - EN50160:2010 via Webpage
 - IEEE519:2014
 - IEC61000-4-30 Ed.3 Class S
- Increased input count to 16 on Arithmetic Modules
- DNP Slave Export and Counter Modules are high-speed
- Arithmetic Module Count increase from 70 to 100









Measurement Canada Updates

10 Year MC Seal

- Jim Passmore has been leading the sampling effort
- Test results are expected to be completed by EoY 2019 and submitted to MC

Fundamental Metering

- Following closely to the MC movement via CEA-Metering Task Group
- Meter type approvals set to begin April 2020
- All meters sold must exclude Harmonic Content by 2024
- Will be launched as a completely new NOA for ION8650





Measurement Canada Mesures Canada

An Agency of Industry Canada Un organisme d'Industrie Canada



